AcriticalanalysisoftheconnectionsthattheUnitedStatesSupremeCourthasmadebetweencampaignfinanceregulationsandvoters’behavior.ThesanctityofpoliticalspeechisakeyelementoftheUnitedStatesConstitutionandacornerstoneoftheAmericanrepublic.WhentheSupremeCourtlinkedpoliticalspeechtocampaignfinanceinitslandmarkBuckleyv.Valeo(1976)decision,themoderneraofcampaignfinanceregulationwasborn.Thedecisionstatedthatinordertopassconstitutionalmuster,anylawslimitingmoneyinpoliticsmustbenarrowlytailoredandserveacompellingstateinterest.ThelonestateinteresttheCourtwaswillingtoentertainwasthemitigationofcorruption.Inordertoreachthisconclusion,theCourtadvancedasophisticatedbehavioralmodelthatmadeassumptionsabouthowlawsaffectvoters’opinionsandbehavior.Theseassumptionshavereceivedsurprisinglylittleattentionuntilnow.InTheAppearanceofCorruption,DaronShaw,BrianRoberts,andMijeongBaekanalyzetheconnectionsthattheCourtmadebetweencampaignfinanceregulationsandvoters’behavior.Thecourtarguedthatanincreaseinperceivedcorruptionwouldlowerengagementandturnout.Drawingfromoriginalsurveydataandexperiments,theyconfrontthequestionofwhathappenswhentheSupremeCourtiswrong-andwhenthefoundationofover40yearsofjurisprudenceissimplynottrue.Evenwiththeheightenedawarenessofcampaignfinanceissuesthatemergedinthewakeofthe2010CitizensUniteddecision,thereislittleempiricalsupportfortheCourt’sreasoningthatturnoutwoulddecline.Arigorousstatisticalanalysis,thisisthefirstworktosimultaneouslynameandtesteachandeveryoneoftheCourt’sassumptionsinthepre-andpost-Citizen’sUnitederas.Itwillalsofundamentallyreshapehowwethinkaboutcampaignfinanceregulation’seffectsonvoterbehavior.
